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1.   Introduction 
Cross-country and bank-level evidence has shown the poor performance of 
government-owned banks, especially in developing countries (La Porta et al, 2001, Dinc, 
2005), so that privatization could be expected to improve performance and thus boost 
efficiency of financial intermediation.  Evidence from individual countries that have 
undertaken large privatization programs, however, has been mixed (Cull, Clarke, and Shirley, 
2005; Megginson, 2005). For example, in Mexico in the early and mid-1990s, privatization 
outcomes were bad enough to prompt re-nationalization of the banking sector in the wake of 
the Tequila crisis (Haber, 2005).  Banking sector performance eventually improved, but only 
after a second round of privatization in the late 1990s in which foreign ownership 
participation was encouraged.  Initial attempts at bank privatization in the Czech Republic, 
and to a lesser extent Poland, were also not fully successful, at least in part because the state 
maintained relatively large shareholdings in the privatized banks and discouraged ownership 
by foreign investors (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005).   
Assessing the effects of privatization across countries is made difficult by country-
specific circumstances that are hard to control for.
1  Researchers have therefore turned to 
country-level studies, which offer natural experiments if data availability allows the 
performance assessment of privatized banks before and after privatization, relative to other 
banks in the financial system and controlling for other bank and country-level but time-variant 
characteristics.  
                                                 
1 Otchere (2005) examines the effects of share issue bank privatizations for twenty-one banks in nine developing 
countries using pooled econometric tests.  In the case of direct sales to strategic investors, this type of cross-
country analysis is more difficult, because share prices cannot be used as performance indicators and listed banks 
are generally subject to lower disclosure standards.   3
This paper assesses the effect of privatization on bank performance in Nigeria over the 
period 1990-2001. Nigeria undertook a major privatization program in the early 1990s, 
divesting a total of 14 banks, constituting more than 50% of total banking system assets.  
However, this period was also characterized by other major changes in the financial system.  
The privatizations were part of a larger liberalization process that included interest rate and 
entry liberalization and the loosening of credit allocation quotas.  At the same time, a multi-
tiered exchange rate market offered plenty of arbitrage and rent opportunities for licensed 
banks.  Consequently, the late 1980s saw a massive entry of new banks specializing in foreign 
exchange operations. While the number of banks multiplied during this period and the 
financial sector boomed, financial intermediation, as measured by credit to the private sector 
and deposits, decreased. Finally, economic recession and political instability brought the 
boom to a halt in 1992, with a major banking crisis crippling the financial system until the late 
1990s.   
The volatile macroeconomic and financial environment, in which the privatization 
took place, makes it difficult to compare the effects of the Nigerian privatization program to 
privatization in other countries.  We therefore evaluate the effects of privatization on bank 
performance relative to the same banks before privatization and to other privately owned 
banks in Nigeria.  Specifically, we assess the performance of privatized banks, i.e. the return 
on assets and equity as well as the share of non-performing loans (NPL), relative to other 
banks in the Nigerian financial system and relative to their performance before privatization.  
Given the large reliance of banks on foreign exchange revenue during the sample period, we 
use profit measures both including and excluding foreign exchange profits.  We apply 
different robustness tests and estimation techniques.   4
Our results indicate some performance improvement due to privatization.  While 
privatized banks performed significantly worse than privately owned commercial banks 
before privatization, this gap was effectively closed by privatization.  This is remarkable 
given the macroeconomic and regulatory environment that was very inhospitable to true 
financial intermediation during our sample period.  However, there were no further 
performance gains beyond the performance of other private banks in the Nigerian banking 
system.   In addition, our results give evidence of the poor performance of banks that 
continued with minority government ownership during the sample period.   
Our results also provide  microeconomic evidence on  the distorted incentives that 
banks faced in Nigeria during the sample period.  Long established banks that focused on 
retail banking performed significantly more poorly than new wholesale banks that focused on 
lending to the government and on fee-based business.  These results are the microeconomic 
complement to the aggregate picture of declining financial intermediation that Nigeria 
suffered during this period.   
Our results are subject to some caveats.  First, poor data quality makes it difficult to 
find significant relationships between bank characteristics such as ownership and bank 
performance.  The fact that we find significant and robust relationships in spite of these 
shortcomings makes us more confident in our findings.  Second, limited information on the 
privatization transactions and the individual banks limit our analysis to a primarily statistical 
one.  We try to offset these hurdles with a thorough sensitivity analysis. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature.  First, it shows the effects of 
privatization on performance in the context of a financial system that went through a boom 
and bust cycle with perverse incentives for true financial intermediation. Second, it analyzes   5
the performance of Nigerian banks over an important period of recent economic history and 
thus complements a large, mostly qualitative literature on banking sector development in this 
African economy, which is second only to South Africa in size.
2 Third, to our knowledge this 
is the first detailed quantitative analysis of bank privatization for an African nation, despite 
substantial recent reductions in state ownership of banks (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2005).  
Fourth, we study share issue privatizations (SIP) in which the government fully divested its 
shareholdings.  In other developing countries where governments attempted SIP of banks, 
they also tended to retain sizable shareholdings, and post-privatization performance 
improvements did not materialize (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2005).  In those cases, it is 
difficult to identify whether poor outcomes should be attributed to the government’s failure to 
fully relinquish its shareholding, or to attempting an SIP where stock markets and the 
associated monitoring of firms by investors were not fully developed.  To the extent that our 
empirical tests reveal that the SIP in Nigeria was unsuccessful, the SIP method itself is called 
into question. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 offers background 
information on the financial system in Nigeria.  Section 3 describes our data and the 
methodology.  Section 4 presents our main results and section 5 provides robustness tests. 
Section 6 offers tests on the nature and quality of post-privatization financial intermediation 
and section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 Sobodu and Akiode (1998) assess the performance of Nigerian commercial banks over the period 1983-1993 
using data envelopment analysis.  They find an initial improvement in performance right after the beginning of 
financial liberalization in 1986 and a steady decline thereafter.  Their sample period, however, does not allow 
them to test the effect of privatization.   6
2.   Banking in Nigeria: From Boom to Bust 
Nigeria's first bank, the African Banking Corporation, was established in 1892. While 
the earliest banks were essentially foreign owned, several wholly or partially indigenous 
banks were established in the 1930s, but the majority of these collapsed. No banking 
legislation existed until 1952, at which point Nigeria had three foreign banks (the Bank of 
British West Africa, Barclays Bank, and the British and French Bank) and two indigenous 
banks (the National Bank of Nigeria and the African Continental Bank).
3 The Central Bank of 
Nigeria, empowered to regulate the industry, commenced operations on July 1, 1959.   
   In the 1970s, the Nigerian authorities introduced an array of direct controls in the 
banking system, both through ownership, as well as through interest rate and credit controls. 
As part of an “indigenization wave” that had the goal of securing domestic majority 
ownership of strategically important sectors, many foreign-owned banks were nationalized, 
since no Nigerian purchaser could be found.
4 While these shares were formally warehoused 
for future sale, they effectively were used for political influence in these banks.  At the same 
time that entry into the banking system was restricted, a floor for deposit and a ceiling for 
lending interest rates were established and a credit allocation quota of up to 70% of a bank’s 
portfolio was enforced. 
In the context of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, Nigeria undertook 
a broad program of financial liberalization.  Interest rates and entry into the banking system 
                                                 
3 The 1952 ordinance set standards, required reserve funds, established bank examinations, and provided for 
assistance to indigenous banks.  
4 In 1993, the Federal Government acquired a 40 per cent equity ownership in the three largest banks. In 1996, 
under the second Nigerian enterprise decree requiring 60 per cent indigenous holding, the Government acquired 
an additional 20 per cent holding in the three banks and 60 per cent in the other foreign–owned banks.    7
were liberalized, and credit allocation quotas loosened. At the same time, while ending direct 
rationing of foreign exchange for the real sector, the government maintained a multiple 
exchange rate regime, thus opening a new area of arbitrage and rent seeking for financial 
institutions that had privileged access to foreign exchange auctions.
5  The consequence was 
the quick entry of many new players into the banking system, especially merchant banks that 
specialized in foreign exchange operations.
6  Very low entry requirements and the high 
market premiums that could be earned with arbitrage activities in the foreign exchange 
markets allowed for returns on equity of 300% or more (Lewis and Stein, 2002).  In the 
following years, the number of banks tripled from 40 to nearly 120 (Table 1), employment in 
the financial sector doubled and the contribution of the financial system to GDP almost tripled 
(Lewis and Stein, 2002).  
The financial sector boom, however, was accompanied by financial dis-
intermediation. Deposits in financial institutions and credit to the private sector, both relative 
to GDP, decreased over the period 1986 to 1992 (Table 1). The increasing number of banks 
and human capital in the financial sector was thus channeled into arbitrage and rent-seeking 
activity rather than financial intermediation.
7   
                                                 
5 The arbitrage potential arose from the spread between the official exchange rate and the interbank rate. After 
the trade liberalization, which was part of the SAP, there was an increasing demand for trade-related financing. 
Lewis and Stein (2002) describe the different arbitrage possibilities in more detail. 
6 Another reason was the still existing guideline on credit growth, which made it more profitable to open a new 
bank than to expand an existing one. 
7 For the empirical tests that follow, data were available from 1990 to 2001, and thus we cannot describe well the 
boom period in speculation which occurred largely in the last half of the 1980s.   8
By 1990, the bubble started to burst.  Non-performing loans (NPL) increased sharply. 
Especially, the merchant bank sector – where most of the foreign exchange speculators were 
concentrated – and the government-owned banks showed increasing signs of distress.  In 
1991, the Central Bank imposed a moratorium on new licenses. New Prudential Guidelines, 
introduced in 1990-91 made the extent of distress in the banking system even clearer. During 
1992, several banks were  scrutinized  and delicensed. By mid  1993, political uncertainty 
following a failed transition to civilian rule triggered a bank run, which resulted in paralysis 
of the financial system, temporary closures and bank failures. Finally, in 1994, the new 
military government reintroduced exchange and interest rate controls.  The following 
inflationary burst, rising black market premium on the Naira and economic decline resulted in 
windfall gains for some connected market participants, while deepening the overall distress in 
the financial system.  
Political economy explanations of the liberalization and boom-and-bust period focus 
on rent-seeking activities of the governing elites (Lewis and Stein, 2002).  While moving 
forward with structural reforms in many areas, liberalization measures were selective to 
maintain patronage opportunities and to insulate the governing elites and their supporters 
from the economic costs of these reforms. The expanding financial sector and the new 
arbitrage possibilities through the multi-tiered exchange rate system offered numerous 
patronage opportunities for political and military leaders.  Bank licensing was a politically 
influenced process and managing boards of banks included many politicians and senior 
military officers.  However, the shift of arbitrage and rent-seeking activities from the real to 
the financial sector – further fostered by macroeconomic instability – also created new groups 
of wealth and economic power.     9
It was in this volatile environment, that in 1992 the privatization agency (Technical 
Committee on Privatization and Commercialization, TCPC) scheduled the sale of government 
shares in eight commercial and six merchant banks in which the federal government had an 
ownership stake.
8 These 14 banks constituted 51% of total banking system assets and 60% of 
total banking system deposits and included the largest three commercial and largest three 
merchant banks.  Eight of these privatizations were implemented through flotation on the 
stock exchange, with purchasers restricted to Nigerians and limited groups of other Africans. 
The government shares in Merchant Bank of Africa, on the other hand, were sold to staff. The 
shares of the privatized banks were widely spread, reportedly to some 150,000 new 
shareholders. Several banks that were originally scheduled to be privatized were not divested.  
This program, however, did not affect the purely state-owned banks and while it reduced, it 
did not eliminate government ownership in the banking system.  In December 1996, there 
were still 20 banks with government interests. 
Following privatization, there were little if any governance changes in the privatized 
banks.  Few privatized banks changed their senior management or governing boards following 
privatization, and recurrent struggles between shareholders and management are reported 
(Lewis and Stein, 2002). In 1995, at the high point of the banking crisis, the government even 
considered renationalizing the banks, but was discouraged by internal and external pressure.  
As the financial boom was fed by arbitrage and rent-seeking activities, so did the 
government use the resolution of the banking crisis for political purposes. A Failed Bank 
Decree was used to prosecute cases of misconduct and fraud in the banking industry, but most 
                                                 
8 The Federal Government had equity investment of at least 45 per cent in thirteen out of the fourteen banks and 
4.45 per cent in Merchant Bank of Africa.    10
detainees were concentrated in specific ethnic groups and groups opposed to the regime. Few 
failing banks, on the other hand, were resolved and the authorities focused more on containing 
than resolving the crisis. It was only under the new government in 1998, which eventually 
handed over power to a civilian regime in May 1999, that a more serious cleanup started in 
the financial system, with 26 bank licenses revoked in 1998.   
 
3.   Data and Methodology 
We have an unbalanced sample of 69 banks with annual data for the period 1990 
through 2001, with a total of 576 observations.  Since not all variables are available for all 
banks, fewer observations are included in some of the regressions. In our empirical analysis, 
we focus on the performance of nine banks that were privatized during the sample period.
9 
Our sample also contains 24 commercial banks and 17 merchant banks that were privately 
owned, as well as eight privately owned banks that changed form (from merchant to 
commercial) during the sample period.
10  We have data on two banks that were completely 
                                                 
9 Not all of these nine banks were privatized in the context of the program mentioned above.  Other banks 
privatized under the program are not included because of lack of data. The banks included in our database and 
classified as privatized are: First Bank, Union Bank, United Bank of Africa, Afribank, FSB International Bank, 
Inland Bank Nigeria, Intercity Bank, Afribank (Merchant) and First Atlantic Bank.  In seven cases, state 
ownership went to zero; in the other two cases, it went from 54% to 11% and from 100% to 33%, respectively.  
10The regulatory difference between commercial and merchant banks has been eliminated recently.  Commercial 
banks were subject to higher thresholds on initial capital, and more restrictions on branching and lending. 
Merchant banks could not take demand deposits and focused mostly on corporate and institutional clients. Until 
1996, merchant banks were required to channel 20% of their loan portfolio into medium- and long-term lending.   
   11
state-owned during the sample period and nine banks with minority-ownership stakes of the 
government.  
In the bulk of our empirical analysis we focus on three performance measures. Return 
on equity (ROE) is defined as profits relative to equity, while return on assets (ROA) is profits 
relative to total assets.   Since a large share of banks’ profits came from foreign exchange 
operations, in some specifications we use measures of ROA and ROE that exclude foreign 
exchange profits.  Excluding foreign exchange operations should provide a better indication 
of banks’ profitability in financial intermediation. Finally, we also use the share of non-
performing loans (NPL) as a performance indicator.   
We assess the effect of ownership patterns beyond privatization of the nine banks.  
Specifically, in Figure 1 we distinguish between five different groups. First, Eventually 
Privatized denotes the banks that were privatized at some point during the sample period.   
However, the links between the state and the banking sector in Nigeria are complex, with the 
government retaining ownership participation in many banks under private control.  In our 
empirical analysis we therefore distinguish between Merchant State and Commercial State 
banks with minority government stakes, as well as for the two banks that were completely 
government-owned. Finally, we distinguish between Merchant Private banks and Merchant 
Commercial banks. 
Figure 1 shows the performance of different bank groups over the whole sample 
period.  While commercial private banks had higher ROE than any other bank group, they 
were at par with the merchant banks, both privately and government-owned, in their ROA and 
NPL ratio. The eventually privatized and commercial state banks had lower ROA and higher   12
NPL ratios than merchant banks and commercial private banks, but similar ROE as other 
banks, except for the commercial private banks. 
Figure 2 shows an improvement in performance after privatization. We present the 
average for each indicator in the three years before and eight years after privatization.
11  ROA 
and ROE, both including and excluding foreign exchange profits show an improvement in the 
first year after privatization before they decrease again, while the NPL ratio increased slightly 
with privatization before decreasing for several years.  While this indicates a positive 
performance effect of privatization, it does not control for (i) changes in performance in other 
Nigerian banks, and (ii) for other bank characteristics and policies that might have changed 
after privatization. Especially, the increase in ROA and ROE after t+4 might be explained by 
macroeconomic improvement that affected all banks.  
To assess the effect of privatization on bank performance, while controlling for other 
bank characteristics, we use the following regression: 
t i t t i
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, 
Performance is one of five variables measuring the performance of bank i at time t. As 
noted, those variables include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the share 
of total loans that are non-performing.  We use ROE and ROA both including and excluding 
foreign exchange revenues. 
                                                 
11 We rearranged the timeline to make data on the nine banks comparable independent of the actual privatization 
date.   13
  We use three explanatory variables to de-compose the causes and effects of 
privatization. The first is Eventually Privatized, a dummy variable that equals one throughout 
the whole sample for banks that were privatized at some point during the sample period.  We 
include this variable to capture any selection effects associated with bank privatization.  To 
the extent that weak banks were privatized, we expect it to have a negative coefficient. The 
second is Privatized, a dummy variable that equals one from the moment bank i is privatized. 
We define privatization as the point where the government relinquished control of a bank, or 
in cases where control had been ceded prior to the beginning of our sample period, the point 
where it relinquished its entire minority shareholding in the bank.  One of the nine banks was 
privatized in 1996, with the remaining eight privatized from 1992 to 1994. Five of the eight 
were privatized in 1993. While Eventually Privatized controls for the selection bias of the 
banks that were privatized, Privatized measures the effect of the privatization itself. The third 
variable is Time since Privatization, which measures the years since bank i was privatized. 
While Privatized is included to capture the immediate effects of privatization, including any 
cleaning of the loan portfolio at or just prior to the time of sale, Time since Privatization 
captures the average yearly performance trend in the wake of that sale.  To statistically assess 
the effect of privatization after year n, we evaluate Privatized + n*Time since Privatization. 
As discussed above, we control for different regulatory and ownership types of banks 
in our sample. Specifically, we control for state participation in banking using three different 
variables.  The first is State Control, a dummy variable equal to one throughout the period for 
banks that were wholly owned by the government, and thus did not experience any changes in 
ownership structure.  Merchant Bank State and Commercial Bank State are dummy variables   14
equal to one if the state had any minority ownership participation in the bank in question.
12  
We use two separate variables because, as described above, the activities of merchant and 
commercial banks differ, which could have implications for performance, and for the impact 
of state ownership on performance.  Finally, Merchant Bank Private is a dummy variable for 
wholly privately owned merchant banks, while privately owned commercial banks are 
captured by the constant. 
  We also include a number of variables to control for the size and age of the bank and 
its business orientation.  Assets is the log of real assets measured at time t-1.  Larger banks 
might have enjoyed scale or scope economies that had positive effects on their performance.
13  
We also control for the age of the bank (Age) since longer established banks might have 
enjoyed performance advantages over relative newcomers. On the other hand, in a developing 
country like Nigeria older banks might have been relatively entrenched in their business 
methods, and thus relatively incapable of pursuing new profit opportunities. Since many new 
banks were established with the purpose of gaining rents on the foreign exchange rate market, 
this would result in a negative relation of Age with Performance.    
In robustness tests, we include further measures of the business and loan portfolio 
orientation and productivity of the bank.  We include two variables to capture the business 
orientation of the bank. Branches, is the log of the number of branches.  Banks with more 
                                                 
12 We also experimented with replacing the minority state participation dummy variable with the government’s 
actual ownership share.  However, the results did not indicate the performance was worse (or better) as the size 
of the minority ownership stake increased.  This could be because the minority state ownership stakes for many 
banks fluctuated during this period.   
13 This was true, for example, for measures of cost and profit efficiency in Argentina in the 1990s (Berger et al., 
2005).   15
branches were likely to have a retail orientation, which also might have had an impact on 
performance, although it is difficult to predict whether any such effect would have been 
positive or negative.  Fee income is the share of non-interest (and non foreign-exchange) 
revenue in total revenue.  
  We include two variables to control for loan portfolio orientation, the ratio of 
government bonds to total assets and the share of loans to banks to total assets.  We include 
two indicators of the productivity of the bank; fixed assets relative to total assets and the ratio 
of  overhead costs to total assets. Finally, we include year dummies to control for 
macroeconomic and business cycle factors that affected all banks. 
  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. There is wide variation in 
performance across banks. ROA varies from 21% to less than -200%. Similarly, ROE varies 
from over 1,300% to less than -20,000%.
14 Even after excluding foreign exchange rate 
revenues, there is still significant variation. Truncating the sample at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentile, however, eliminates most of the outliers.  The NPL ratio ranges from zero to 92%. 
There is wide variation in both size and age across banks, as well as business and portfolio 
orientation and productivity. 
  All five performance indicators are significantly correlated with each other. 
Interestingly, few of our ownership dummy variables are significantly correlated with 
performance. Neither the age nor the size of the bank is correlated with performance, while 
banks with a larger share of government bonds, less fixed assets and lower overhead costs 
                                                 
14 The extremely low ROE numbers are by construction: in case of negative equity, we set equity at 1% of assets 
to calculate ROE and to thus avoid a positive ROE for banks with negative equity and losses.   16
have higher ROA and ROE. The banks that were eventually privatized are larger, and older, 
have more branches, have higher overhead costs and have a lower share of fee-based income.   
  One of the estimation problems we faced was poor data quality, which stems from the 
poor quality of accounting standards common among developing countries.
15  In the case of 
Nigeria, these problems are exacerbated by the high and volatile inflation the country suffered 
during our sample period.
16  Further, poor and politically influenced supervision standards 
decreased the opportunity costs of deficient financial reporting. All these factors bias our 
estimations against finding any significant relationship between the privatization process and 
bank performance.  Following Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002), we deal with this problem 
in two different ways.  First, we restrict the sample to values of the dependent variable 
between the 1
st and the 99
th percentiles to thus exclude outliers such as discussed above. In the 
case of NPL, we restrict only on the upper end – the 99
th percentile – given the restriction that 
NPL cannot fall below zero.  Second, we use a robust estimation technique that uses all 
observations available, but assigns different weights to avoid the impact of outliers. 
Specifically, observations are weighted based on the absolute value of their residuals, with 
observations with large residuals being assigned smaller weights. Unlike in the case of the 
truncated sample, where we assign a zero weight a-priori to observations with extreme values 
and one to all others, the robust regressions assign these weights in an iterative process.  
 
                                                 
15 Nigeria scores 59 out of 90 on a cross-country indicator of accounting standards, complied by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) for 1990.  This compares to sample median of 64 and 
sample mean of 61 for 41 countries, for which data are available. South Africa, the only other African country in 
this sample, scores 70. 
16 Inflation varied between 5% and over 50% over the period 1990 and 2001.   17
4.   Main Results 
The results in Table 3 provide evidence of  a significant and robust performance 
improvement after privatization.  We present models where we restrict the sample to values of 
the dependent variable between the 1
st and 99
th percentile of its distribution in columns one 
through five, and models where we use all observations in robust regressions to control for the 
impact of outliers, in columns six through ten.  
There is strong evidence that relatively weak banks were chosen for privatization.  
Eventually Privatized enters significantly and with the expected sign in all ten regressions. 
The banks that were eventually privatized had a lower return on assets and on equity, both 
including and excluding foreign exchange profits, and had higher NPL.  This suggests that the 
government relinquished control of relatively weak banks.  Significance difference tests 
between Eventually Privatized, on the one hand, and Merchant-State and Commercial-State, 
on the other hand, also indicate that the eventually privatized banks were weaker than the 
banks where the government kept their minority stake; the only differences that are not 
significant are between Merchant State and Eventually Privatized in the ROA regressions. 
Privatization resulted in a significant increase in ROE and a significant decrease in 
NPL.  Privatized enters significantly and positively in all ROE regressions and significantly 
and negatively in both NPL regressions; it just misses significance in the robust ROA 
regression and is significant at the ten percent level in the robust ROA regression that 
excludes foreign exchange operations.
17 The coefficients on Privatized and Eventually 
                                                 
17 Since the difference in the computation of these ratios is assets versus equity, one might be concerned that  
share issues affected the equity value of privatized banks and thus measures of ROA and ROE.  Therefore, 
improvements in ROE might have been larger than those for ROA because equity was not measured well (i.e., 
was smaller than it should have been).  However, both assets and equity grew at about the same pace around the   18
Privatized are of similar size, but of opposite sign in all regressions where both enter 
significantly, which indicates that the performance gap between commercial privately owned 
banks and privatized banks was closed through privatization. However, this also indicates that 
performance improvements are bounded by the quality of other banks in the system.
18 Further, 
there was no performance improvement in the years after privatization, as indicated by the 
insignificant coefficients on Time since Privatization. Of course, that insignificance also 
implies that the privatized banks did not return to their laggard pre-privatization performance, 
but rather remained on par with other private banks. 
The regression results  in Table 3 also indicate that commercial banks that had a 
minority government ownership throughout the period and were not privatized performed 
significantly worse than commercial privately owned banks; Commercial Bank State enters 
significant at at least the 10% level in all robust regressions, and significant at the 5% level or 
better in the ROA and NPL truncated regressions.  This suggests that minority ownership 
hampered the performance of these banks significantly.  
                                                                                                                                                          
time of privatization.  For the banks that underwent privatization from 1992 to 1994, nominal assets grew by 
81% in the year of privatization, while equity grew by 73%. In the two years prior to privatization, the ratio of 
equity to assets averaged 8.7%, while in the two years after privatization it was 9.5%.  What seems more likely is 
that the assets and equity of private and state banks not involved in privatization were not measured well in 1991 
and 1992.  For those banks, the correlation between ROA and ROE was only 0.51 in 1991-1992, and 0.98 in 
1993-1994.  For the privatized banks, the 1991-92 correlation was 0.78, while the 1993-94 correlation was 0.85. 
When the 1991-1992 data are excluded, the “privatized” coefficient becomes significant in the ROA regressions.  
In the robust specifications, for example, the coefficient becomes +0.46, which is significant at the five percent 
level.   
18 Similar results were found for the case of privatized state banks in Argentina (Berger et al., 2005).   19
There is no robust evidence on the performance of merchant banks relative to privately 
owned commercial banks.  While privately owned merchant banks have significantly lower 
NPL than commercial banks, the evidence on ROA and ROE is not robust across different 
estimation techniques and to the exclusion of foreign exchange profits.  Similarly, merchant 
banks with minority government ownership enjoyed lower NPL than privately owned 
commercial banks, but the evidence on ROA and ROE is not consistent and robust.  There is 
no significant difference between merchant banks that are completely privately owned and 
those with minority government ownership. Finally, the results indicate that older banks and 
smaller banks perform worse. This seems to indicate that larger banks did enjoy economies of 
scale and scope and that new entrants into the market were better able to pursue new profit 
opportunities.  Given that age enters significantly even in the performance regressions where 
we exclude foreign exchange profits, this effect cannot be attributed completely to foreign 
exchange speculation.  
The regressions in Table 4 confirm our previous finding of a positive link between 
privatization and performance, and give some additional insights into bank characteristics that 
explain variation in bank profitability. Here we include additional indicators of business and 
portfolio orientation and productivity. Columns one through five present results of the sample 
limited to the 1
st through 99
th percentile, while columns six through ten report the results of 
robust regressions.   
While weak banks were chosen for privatization, privatization did close the 
performance gap relative to privately owned commercial banks.  Eventually Privatized enters 
significantly in all ten regressions, while Privatized enters significantly in all but two 
regressions. As before, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of both coefficients is not   20
significantly different from zero, and the insignificant coefficient for Time since Privatization 
indicates that the performance improvement at the time of privatization was maintained. Also 
as before, larger and younger banks perform better. However, in Table 4 we cannot find any 
robust link between the other ownership dummies and performance.  
The results in Table 4 also indicate that retail-oriented banks with a larger branch 
network have a lower ROA, while there is evidence that banks focusing on fee-based business 
have a higher ROE and ROA, but also a higher NPL ratio.  Banks with a larger share of 
government bonds in their portfolio performed better, enjoying higher ROA and ROE, while 
there is no significant and robust relationship between the importance of interbank loans and 
performance.  Finally, banks with higher overhead costs relative to assets perform worse, 
while there is no robust relationship between the share of fixed assets and performance. By 
comparing Tables 3 and 4, one can see that the inclusion of the overhead costs variable does 
not greatly alter the privatization coefficients. This suggests that the post-privatization 
improvements in profitability and portfolio quality were not attributable to cost savings.  In 
fact, the privatization variable is more highly significant in most specifications in Table 4, 
which are our preferred models because they better control for banks inputs and outputs.   
 
5. Robustness  Checks 
In a sample with potential measurement error and multiple observations from the same 
bank, error terms might not truly be independent of one another.  In particular, the errors for 
individual banks might be correlated.  Moreover, to the extent that measurement error is likely 
to be systematically higher for particular banks, their observations could be driving our 
results.  We offer two solutions.  The first relaxes the assumption of independent errors,   21
allowing for correlation between observations from the same bank, using so-called clustered 
standard errors.
19  The second uses bank-specific fixed effects, which directly control for 
heterogeneity between different banks.   
Controlling for clustered standard error terms does not change the conclusions of our 
paper (Table 5, columns 1-5).  Eventually Privatized still enters significantly, negatively in 
the ROE and positively in the NPL regressions (10% level in the ROA regressions), while 
Privatized enters positively and significantly at the 5% level in the ROE and negatively and 
significantly at the 10% level in the NPL regressions.    Controlling for clustered standard 
errors, we still find that banks with higher fee-based income have higher ROA and ROE, but 
also higher NPL, and banks with a higher share of government bonds and lower overhead 
costs have higher ROE and ROA and lower NPL.  
 Controlling  for  bank-specific fixed effects does not affect our findings (Table 5, 
columns 6-10). Introducing fixed effects changes the interpretation of our coefficients as 
implying changes from the bank-specific mean, so that all variables that are constant over the 
entire period for individual banks are dropped from the regressions. Specifically, we do not 
have to control anymore for selection bias by introducing the variable Eventually Privatized.  
Privatized enters significantly and positively in the regressions of ROE, ROE No Forex, and 
ROA No Forex, and significantly and negatively in the NPL regression, indicating a clear 
performance improvement after privatization.  Banks that relied more on fee-based income 
and had a higher share of government bonds had higher ROA and ROE, but also a higher 
                                                 
19 See Deaton (1997, pp. 73-78) for a detailed discussion of clustering.  Also, see Huber (1967) and Rogers 
(1993).   22
NPL ratio.  Banks with lower overhead costs had higher ROE and ROA and a lower NPL 
ratio. 
In unreported regressions, available on request, we derived cost and profit efficiency 
measures to predict how well each bank would perform if it produced the same set of outputs, 
following the method of Berger et al. (2005), and used them as dependent variables.  None of 
the regressions, however, showed any significant effect of privatization, which we explain 
with the low data quality and the limited information we have on the outputs and inputs of the 
banks in our sample. 
 
6.  Nature and Quality of Post-Privatization Financial Intermediation 
  When we control for the portfolio and operating characteristics of the banks using the 
variables in Table 4, post-privatization improvement is, if anything, larger than it was without 
those variables. This suggests that those improvements are attributable to changes in operating 
and portfolio variables that we cannot measure.  However, it is still possible that privatized 
banks made significant changes on the different dimensions that we can measure.  In this 
section, therefore, we offer direct tests of whether post-privatization improvements in 
profitability and portfolio quality coincided with changes in variables describing business 
practices and portfolio orientation.   
In Table 6, overhead costs, government bonds, fixed assets and interbank loans, all 
relative to total assets are the dependent variables, while we use the same explanatory 
variables as in the base regressions of Table 3.
20 The regressions suggest that the banks that 
were eventually privatized had lower overhead costs, held less government bonds and fixed 
                                                 
20 While we present simple OLS regressions, Tobit and robust regressions yield the same results.   23
assets but lent more to other banks.  However, Eventually Privatized enters negatively and 
significantly only in the government bonds/assets regressions, while positively and 
significantly at the 10% level in the loans to banks/assets regression. Privatized always takes 
the opposite sign to Eventually Privatized, but enters significantly only in the overhead costs 
regression, where the coefficient for the years since privatization is negative and significant.  
This suggests that privatized banks were incurring costs while re-orienting their business, but 
that those costs dissipated over time.  The estimated coefficients imply that a typical 
privatized bank would achieve a ratio of overhead costs on par with that of other private 
banks  in  eight  years.      Although the overhead costs regression suggests some changes in 
business orientation, they are not reflected in the portfolio orientation variables.  These results 
are further confirmation that the performance improvements in our base results are not easily 
traced to the variables that we can measure.  On a more positive note, these results also 
suggest that privatized banks did not boost profits simply by buying government bonds or by 
lending to other financial institutions, and the cost results indicate that some changes in 
business practices were occurring.  However, without more detailed data, we are unable to 
document exactly what those changes were. 
In Table 7, finally, we assess the effect of privatization on foreign exchange revenue 
relative to total income, total assets and equity.
21  While none of these variables measures 
return on foreign exchange activity, they provide us with an indication of business orientation 
before and after privatization.  While Eventually Privatized enters positively and significantly 
in all regressions, Privatized or Time since Privatization enters negatively and significantly, 
                                                 
21 In these regressions, none of our year dummies enters significantly, consistent with our earlier observation that 
our sample period misses most of the high-speculation period.   24
suggesting that these banks relied more on foreign exchange business pre-privatization than 
private commercial banks, while reducing their reliance post-privatization. The coefficients 
for  Privatized and Time since Privatization, which are negative and jointly significant, 
indicate that within a short period privatized banks shifted to foreign exchange shares of 
income similar to those for other private commercial banks.
22 
 
7.   Conclusions 
  Using a unique database on Nigerian banks, this paper has shown some positive 
performance effects of privatization, even in an economy with weak institutions and  a 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment that was inhospitable to financial intermediation.  
While government owned banks performed significantly worse in terms of profitability and 
loan portfolio quality than privately owned banks, privatization helped close this gap, while 
other government-owned banks, even with only a minority ownership stake of the 
government, continued with the significantly poorer performance.  Our findings, however, 
also show the boundaries of privatization.  We do not find any performance improvement 
beyond other private banks in the Nigerian banking system.  The underlying perverse 
incentive structure that was given by adverse macroeconomic conditions and regulatory 
                                                 
22 Foreign exchange speculation, however, does not necessarily have to show up only in foreign exchange 
revenue, since the corresponding profits can be obtained in the money market, as examples from other 
developing countries have shown. While we cannot say for sure that privatized banks were reducing their foreign 
exchange operations, we can say that, for them not to have done so would have required a switch from pure 
foreign exchange speculation to speculation through the money market.  We know of no anecdotal evidence 
supporting that view. 
   25
arbitrariness resulted in high returns on investment in government bonds and non-lending 
activities, while apparently punishing banks focusing on retail lending.   
  In the end, the Nigeria case is difficult to classify as a success or failure.  On the one 
hand, it offers evidence of limited performance improvement after a share issue privatization 
in a relatively weak institutional environment.  At least a part of that performance 
improvement is likely attributable to the government fully relinquishing its shareholding in 
these banks.  In SIP in other developing countries, the government has tended to retain 
substantial shares in the ‘privatized’ bank, and performance did not improve. On the other 
hand, the performance improvements relate only to profitability and portfolio quality.  Since 
other tests indicate that privatization did not bring about cost reductions, at least not in the 
first years thereafter, profitability improvement is only attributable to increased revenue 
generation.  Moreover, since the mix of profit generating activities for Nigerian banks was 
tilted away from private lending, it is doubtful that increased profitability coincided with 
substantial welfare improvement.        26
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Table 1: Financial Development Indicators for Nigeria, 1985-2001. 




1985  34.23% 17.52%  24.31% 40 
1986  35.74% 20.96%  25.75% 41 
1987  26.95% 17.28%  20.37% 50 
1988  29.33% 17.59%  22.55% 66 
1989  22.29% 13.05%  15.65% 81 
1990  20.76% 11.87%  13.72% 107 
1991  22.39% 11.45%  15.10% 119 
1992  21.06% 11.64%  14.29% 119 
1993  18.15% 12.71%  17.37% 119 
1994  9.19% 12.39%  16.43%  116 
1995  5.42% 9.18%  9.81% 115 
1996  4.58% 8.42%  8.12% 115 
1997  5.00% 9.69%  9.07% 115 
1998  6.17% 11.83%  11.12%  89 
1999  7.49% 12.24%  12.93%   
2000  7.43% 11.14%  13.52%   
2001  8.07% 12.70%  15.41%   
Source: Financial Structure Database, World Bank, and Lewis and Stein (2002). Liquid Liabilities is liquid liabilities of the financial system divided by GDP.  
Private Credit is claims of financial institutions on the non-financial private sector divided by GDP.  Financial deposits is total deposits in financial institutions 





   29
 
Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 






ROA 576 3.6% 3.9% 11.6% 21.1% -224.1% -16.0% 14.7%
ROA- No Forex  521 2.4% 2.9% 12.0% 15.5% -225.3% -16.9% 14.0%
ROE 576 -25.0% 34.3% 1074.0% 1346.6% -22412.7% -353.7% 349.3%
ROE-No Forex  521 -43.7% 26.4% 1133.1% 1346.6% -22525.8% -414.2% 242.6%
NPL 563 20.2% 15.4% 17.0% 91.8% 0.0% 0.3% 77.4%
Eventually Privatized  576 0.14 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
State Control  576 0.02 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Merchant Bank State   576 0.04 0.00 0.19 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Merchant Bank Private  576 0.33 0.00 0.47 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Commercial Bank Private  576 0.37 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Commercial Bank State  576 0.10 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age 576 15.1 9.0 18.0 106.0 1.0 2.0 100.0
Government Bonds/Assets  559 13.0% 10.1% 10.6% 54.7% 0.0% 0.1% 51.6%
Fixed Assets/Assets  576 4.7% 4.3% 2.8% 25.6% 0.0% 0.5% 13.9%
Loans to Banks/Assets  576 27.1% 25.7% 15.8% 76.1% 0.1% 1.9% 68.6%
Branches 576 27.1 7.0 58.3 299.0 0.0 0.0 287.0
Fee Income/Assets   519 28.3% 27.1% 13.0% 76.0% 4.3% 6.2% 65.7%
Overhead Costs/Assets  576 7.2% 6.6% 3.6% 34.5% 0.9% 2.4% 19.6%
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Panel B: Correlations 
  
   ROA 
ROA - No 
Forex ROE 
ROE -No 






















ROA  -  No  Forex  0.9913*** 1                          
ROE  0.9547*** 0.9627***  1                      
ROE – No 
Forres 0.9624*** 0.9641***  0.9999***  1                    
NPL  -0.2985*** -0.3159***  -0.1907***  -0.2099*** 1                   
Assets  0.0505 0.0658  0.0545  0.0596 0.0034 1                  
Eventually 
Privatized  -0.0446 -0.0343  0.0186  0.0212 0.1463*** 0.3417*** 1                 
Privatized  -0.0321 -0.0189  0.0177  0.0211 0.0701* 0.2786*** 0.8842*** 1                
Time since 
Privatization  -0.0246 -0.0104  0.0161  0.0194 0.0196 0.2810*** 0.7728*** 0.8740*** 1               
State  Control  -0.0216 -0.0111  0.0093  0.0087 -0.0302 0.0867* -0.0648 -0.0573 -0.05 1              
Merchant  State  0.0297 0.0255  0.0114  0.0133 -0.1041** 0.0897** -0.0798* -0.0706* -0.0617 -0.0307 1             
Merchant 
Private  0.0266 -0.0019  -0.0396  -0.044 -0.0793* -0.4146*** -0.2890*** -0.2555*** -0.2234*** -0.1112*** -0.1370*** 1          
Commercial 
State  -0.0211 -0.0094  0.0194  0.0205 0.1524*** -0.0092 -0.1333*** -0.1179*** -0.1030** -0.0513 -0.0632 -0.2288***  1        
Commercial 
Private  0.0147 0.0266  0.0059  0.0055 -0.0724* 0.0990** -0.3131*** -0.2769*** -0.2420*** -0.1205*** -0.1485*** -0.5375***  -0.2480*** 1       
Age  -0.033 -0.0272 0.0319 0.0332 0.2053*** 0.6161*** 0.4779*** 0.3990*** 0.3679*** 0.1989*** 0.0740* -0.2124*** 0.0681 -0.2744*** 1          
Branches -0.0108 0.011  0.065  0.0688 0.1670*** 0.7259*** 0.4044*** 0.3476*** 0.3335*** 0.1952*** -0.0861** -0.6330*** 0.2281*** 0.1622*** 0.6880*** 1     
Fee Income  -0.0471 -0.0574  -0.0626  -0.074 0.1972*** -0.0678 -0.1266*** -0.0982** -0.0937** 0.1259*** -0.0829* -0.2069***  0.0108 0.2772*** -0.0676 0.1224*** 1    
Govt. Bonds  0.1316*** 0.1476***  0.0732*  0.0747* 0.0014 0.0947** -0.0369 0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0257 0.0409 -0.1078**  -0.0786* 0.1721*** -0.0498 0.0531 0.1192*** 1   
Loans to Banks  0.0229 0.0128  0.0038  0.0047 -0.1036** -0.1031** 0.0012 -0.0206 -0.0121 -0.1112*** 0.1561*** 0.3466*** -0.2225*** -0.2288*** -0.0261 -0.3607*** -0.1596*** -0.2940*** 1  
Fixed Assets  -0.2291*** -0.2457*** -0.1852*** -0.1984*** 0.2605*** -0.0824** 0.0097 0.0178 0.0098 0.0392 -0.1172*** -0.1027**  0.1162*** 0.0554 0.0951** 0.1429*** 0.1795*** -0.0914** -0.2182*** 1
Overhead costs  -0.5107*** -0.5359*** -0.4468*** -0.4663*** 0.4608*** -0.1576*** 0.0895** 0.1077*** 0.0523 0.0015 -0.1201*** -0.1772***  0.1000** 0.0931** -0.0056 0.1009** 0.2230*** -0.0856** -0.2276*** 0.4210***
 
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively 
 
 
   31
 
 
Table 3: Privatization and Bank Performance 
 
 White  Robust  Reg 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 ROE  ROA  NPL 
ROE- No 
Forex 
ROA – No 
Forex ROE ROA NPL 
ROE- No 
Forex 
ROA – No 
Forex 
Assets 0.1  0.007 -0.043 0.086 0.008 0.096 0.005 -0.033 0.103 0.008
   (5.34)***  (3.77)*** (4.86)*** (4.09)*** (4.19)*** (8.79)*** (3.84)*** (5.06)*** (8.95)*** (5.45)***
Eventually Privatized  -0.426  -0.025 0.15 -0.479 -0.024 -0.306 -0.021 0.223 -0.299 -0.024
   (3.29)***  (2.55)** (3.01)*** (3.14)*** (2.42)** (4.88)*** (2.64)*** (5.83)*** (4.67)*** (2.98)***
Privatized 0.316  0.008 -0.132 0.425 0.019 0.235 0.017 -0.205 0.227 0.019
   (2.04)**  (0.52) (2.02)** (2.46)** (1.60) (2.84)*** (1.64) (4.12)*** (2.70)*** (1.81)*
Time since   -0.001  0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 -0.0003
Privatization (0.08)  (0.33) (0.70) (0.19) (0.49) (0.02) (0.81) (0.23) (0.38) (0.20)
State Control  -0.019  -0.017 -0.085 -0.121 -0.009 -0.057 -0.015 -0.05 -0.009 -0.008
   (0.20)  (3.59)*** (2.24)** (0.86) (1.80)* (0.93) (1.97)** (1.39) (0.15) (1.01)
-0.094 0.01 -0.103 -0.049 0.007 -0.121 0.012 -0.07 -0.103 0.007 Merchant Bank State  
(1.41) (2.10)** (4.74)*** (0.76) (1.34) (2.44)** (2.00)** (2.40)** (2.04)** (1.13)
-0.074 0.01 -0.067 -0.082 0.005 -0.035 0.01 -0.06 -0.025 0.009 Merchant Bank Private 
(2.13)** (2.74)*** (3.59)*** (1.99)** (1.08) (1.48) (3.45)*** (4.30)*** (0.98) (2.85)***
-0.022 -0.012 0.055 -0.042 -0.009 -0.104 -0.011 0.09 -0.092 -0.008 Commercial Bank State 
(0.32) (4.23)*** (2.57)** (0.78) (2.63)*** (3.11)*** (2.61)*** (4.55)*** (2.49)** (1.71)*
Age -0.004  -.0005 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.0004 0.003 -0.005 -0.001
   (3.87)***  (5.10)*** (6.85)*** (4.12)*** (5.93)*** (5.06)*** (4.67)*** (6.29)*** (5.95)*** (5.61)***
Constant -0.6  -0.019 0.643 -0.546 -0.052 -0.492 -0.002 0.473 -0.572 -0.035
   (2.74)***  (0.71) (5.55)*** (2.26)** (2.36)** (2.50)** (0.09) (4.07)*** (2.82)*** (1.38)
Observations 564  563 557 509 509 576 576 563 521 521
R-squared  0.15 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.18 0.27 0.26 0.18 
Assets and Age are entered in logs.  T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. All models include year dummies.  
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Table 4: Privatization and Bank Performance: Controlling for Further Bank Characteristics 
 
 White  Robust  Reg 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 ROE  ROA  NPL 
ROE- No 
Forex 
ROA – No 
Forex  ROE ROA NPL 
ROE- No 
Forex 
ROA – No 
Forex 
Assets 0.06 0.006 -0.03 0.058 0.007 0.062 0.006 -0.026 0.085 0.008
   (2.83)*** (2.58)** (3.19)*** (2.49)** (3.15)*** (4.51)*** (3.47)*** (3.42)*** (5.82)*** (4.69)***
Eventually Privatized  -0.47 -0.024 0.166 -0.573 -0.023 -0.378 -0.021 0.245 -1.041 -0.026
   (3.59)*** (2.78)*** (3.17)*** (3.59)*** (2.52)** (5.35)*** (2.42)** (6.00)*** (14.43)*** (2.87)***
Privatized 0.415 0.015 -0.146 0.578 0.023 0.249 0.024 -0.21 0.951 0.018
   (2.52)** (1.26) (2.42)** (3.13)*** (2.00)** (2.76)*** (2.14)** (4.09)*** (10.36)*** (1.58)
Time since Privatization  -0.002 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.01 -0.002 0.001 0.009 0.001
  (0.11) (0.19) (0.15) (0.38) (0.77) (0.72) (1.27) (0.09) (0.69) (0.31)
State Control  0.029 -0.015 -0.082 -0.119 -0.006 -0.038 -0.013 -0.051 0.037 -0.007
   (0.25) (2.87)*** (2.05)** (0.72) (1.12) (0.57) (1.53) (1.41) (0.55) (0.81)
Merchant Bank State   -0.078 0.004 -0.022 -0.099 -0.005 -0.142 0.003 -0.003 -0.141 -0.007
 (1.04) (0.71) (0.86) (1.46) (0.91) (2.60)*** (0.51) (0.10) (2.51)** (1.00)
Merchant Bank Private  -0.049 0.004 0.007 -0.091 -0.003 -0.064 0.002 0.008 -0.054 -0.002
 (0.90) (0.95) (0.30) (1.74)* (0.60) (1.99)** (0.38) (0.44) (1.59) (0.41)
Commercial Bank State  0.064 -0.004 0.039 0.039 -0.001 -0.069 -0.004 0.074 -0.058 -0.001
 (0.75) (1.16) (1.89)* (0.55) (0.15) (1.88)* (0.95) (3.64)*** (1.38) (0.17)
Age -0.003 -0.0001 0.002 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.0001 0.002 -0.003 -0.0001
   (2.23)** (1.64) (4.54)*** (2.07)** (2.26)** (2.49)** (0.84) (4.03)*** (3.00)*** (1.17)
Branches 0.025 -0.004 0.008 0.0003 -0.006 0.009 -0.007 0.006 -0.006 -0.008
   (0.91) (1.76)* (0.78) (0.01) (2.30)** (0.58) (3.56)*** (0.66) (0.33) (3.69)***
Fee Income   0.701 0.064 0.22 0.714 0.047 0.193 0.048 0.199 0.218 0.055
   (3.78)*** (4.44)*** (3.79)*** (3.87)*** (3.19)*** (2.26)** (4.57)*** (4.22)*** (2.31)** (4.66)***
Government Bonds  0.621 0.036 0.072 0.704 0.042 0.503 0.022 0.047 0.606 0.031
   (3.33)*** (2.25)** (1.07) (3.62)*** (2.59)** (5.00)*** (1.74)* (0.83) (5.59)*** (2.27)**
Loans to Banks  0.005 -0.011 -0.011 0.043 -0.011 0.014 -0.017 -0.028 -0.051 -0.033
   (0.03) (0.85) (0.20) (0.27) (0.78) (0.18) (1.80)* (0.66) (0.60) (3.15)***
Fixed Assets  -1.045 -0.07 0.079 -0.188 0.004 -1.115 -0.039 -0.718 -0.529 0.045
   (1.76)* (1.37) (0.21) (0.35) (0.07) (2.96)*** (0.84) (3.47)*** (1.32) (0.89)
Overhead Costs  -2.086 -0.25 1.821 -2.955 -0.379 -1.614 -0.18 2.162 -2.428 -0.492
   (2.27)** (3.02)*** (6.86)*** (3.88)*** (4.49)*** (4.87)*** (4.39)*** (12.61)*** (6.95)*** (11.32)***
Constant -0.362 -0.005 0.351 -0.27 -0.029 -0.322 -0.011 0.16 -0.378 -0.008
   (1.48) (0.18) (2.94)*** (0.94) (1.06) (1.78)* (0.51) (1.40) (1.73)* (0.30)
Observations 490 488 484 438 437 499 499 488 447 447
R-squared  0.28 0.29 0.39 0.33 0.31 0.40 0.28 0.50 0.58 0.45 
Assets, Age and Branches are entered in logs. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. All models include year 
dummies.   
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Table 5: Privatization and Bank Performance: Alternative Estimation Techniques 
  Clustered Regression  Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 ROE  ROA  NPL 
ROE- No 
Forex 
ROA – No 
Forex ROE ROA NPL 
ROE- No 
Forex 
ROA – No 
Forex 
Assets 0.06 0.006 -0.03 0.058 0.007 -0.049 -0.004 -0.017 -0.052 0.001
   (1.98)* (1.56) (2.31)** (1.72)* (2.05)** (1.48) (1.54) (1.51) (1.48) (0.28)
Eventually Privatized  -0.47 -0.024 0.166 -0.573 -0.023
   (2.89)*** (1.94)* (2.52)** (2.71)*** (1.85)*
Privatized 0.415 0.015 -0.146 0.578 0.023 0.354 0.011 -0.145 0.548 0.022
   (2.12)** (1.34) (1.93)* (2.45)** (1.66) (2.58)** (1.10) (3.05)*** (4.08)*** (2.09)**
Time since Privatization  -0.002 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.023 0.0004 0.002 0.01 0.0001
  (0.12) (0.20) (0.10) (0.38) (0.72) (1.07) (0.25) (0.29) (0.49) (0.07)
State Control  0.029 -0.015 -0.082 -0.119 -0.006
   (0.14) (1.93)* (1.10) (1.98)* (0.85)
Merchant Bank State  -0.078 0.004 -0.022 -0.099 -0.005
 (0.59) (0.48) (0.78) (0.85) (0.56)
Merchant Bank Private  -0.049 0.004 0.007 -0.091 -0.003 -0.042 0.003 0.03 0.036 -0.001
 (0.58) (0.55) (0.19) (1.05) (0.34) (0.39) (0.41) (0.84) (0.31) (0.15)
Commercial Bank State   0.064 -0.004 0.039 0.039 -0.001
 (0.48) (0.75) (1.08) (0.42) (0.10)
Age -0.003 -0.0001 0.002 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.004 0.004 -0.032 -0.014 0.003
   (1.66) (1.09) (2.89)*** (1.57) (1.37) (0.06) (0.76) (1.49) (0.21) (0.52)
Branches 0.025 -0.004 0.008 0.0003 -0.006 0.116 0.004 0.018 0.091 0.002
   (0.62) (1.07) (0.57) (0.01) (1.44) (2.47)** (1.10) (1.14) (1.88)* (0.50)
Fee Income   0.701 0.064 0.22 0.714 0.047 0.762 0.07 0.121 0.733 0.058
   (2.88)*** (3.29)*** (2.55)** (3.06)*** (2.50)** (4.74)*** (5.65)*** (2.24)** (4.22)*** (4.13)***
Government Bonds  0.621 0.036 0.072 0.704 0.042 0.495 0.025 0.15 0.585 0.02
   (2.84)*** (2.28)** (0.76) (3.24)*** (2.63)** (2.92)*** (1.93)* (2.57)** (3.33)*** (1.38)
Loans to Banks   0.005 -0.011 -0.011 0.043 -0.011 -0.171 -0.02 0.099 -0.097 -0.021
 (0.04) (1.05) (0.17) (0.37) (0.91) (1.18) (1.76)* (2.00)** (0.63) (1.73)*
Fixed Assets   -1.045 -0.07 0.079 -0.188 0.004 -1.493 -0.074 -0.183 -0.367 0.009
   (1.68)* (1.06) (0.18) (0.27) (0.06) (1.76)* (1.11) (0.64) (0.40) (0.12)
Overhead Costs  -2.086 -0.25 1.821 -2.955 -0.379 -1.932 -0.186 1.844 -2.321 -0.318
   (2.37)** (4.07)*** (6.65)*** (4.62)*** (4.11)*** (2.56)** (3.54)*** (9.08)*** (2.99)*** (5.36)***
Constant -0.362 -0.005 0.351 -0.27 -0.029 0.519 -0.003 0.624 0.699 -0.026
   (1.07) (0.13) (2.35)** (0.83) (0.75) (0.36) (0.03) (1.35) (0.47) (0.22)
Observations 490 488 484 438 437 490 488 484 438 437
R-squared  0.28 0.29 0.39 0.33 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.20 
Number of banks  66 66 66 64 64
Assets, Age and Branches are entered in logs. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. All models include year 



























  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Assets -0.014 0.013 -0.009 0.024
   (7.32)*** (2.23)** (6.25)*** (3.12)***
Eventually Privatized  -0.004 -0.072 -0.010 0.068
   (0.45) (2.50)** (1.37) (1.81)*
Privatized 0.025 0.059 0.004 -0.061
   (2.04)** (1.56) (0.38) (1.21)
Time since Privatization  -0.003 -0.002 -0.0002 0.005
   (1.76)* (0.29) (0.15) (0.69)
State Control  -0.007 -0.013 -0.010 -0.072
   (0.68) (0.39) (1.18) (1.61)
Merchant Bank State  -0.017 0.001 -0.014 0.070
 (1.96)** (0.03) (2.04)** (2.00)**
Merchant Bank Private  -0.015 -0.029 -0.006 0.036
 (3.22)*** (1.91)* (1.49) (1.87)*
Commercial Bank State  -0.002 -0.043 -0.001 -0.033
 (0.28) (2.54)** (0.19) (1.51)
Age 0.0001 -0.001 0.0003 0.002
   (0.81) (1.44) (2.61)*** (4.24)***
Branches 0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.067
   (2.71)*** (0.12) (3.02)*** (7.12)***
Constant 0.207 0.022 0.130 0.109
   (11.64)*** (0.39) (9.44)*** (1.52)
Observations 570 553 570 570
R-squared 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.27
Assets, Age and Branches are entered in logs. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively    35
Table 7. Income Broken Down by Source 
 
  Foreign Exchange Income 
 
 






 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Assets -.004  -.0005 .004
   (1.81)*  (1.32) (1.04)
Eventually Privatized  .040  .006 .062
   (3.26)***  (3.05)*** (3.20)***
Privatized -.026  -.002 -.057
   (1.69)*  (0.68) (2.24)**
Time since Privatization  -.003  -.001 -.001
   (1.26)  (2.02)** (0.38)
State Control  -.015  -.003 -.027
   (1.50)  (1.46) (1.43)
Merchant Bank State  .023  .005 .007
 (2.77)***  (3.06)*** (0.45)
Merchant Bank Private  .014  .003 .006
 (3.31)***  (4.21)*** (0.73)
Commercial Bank State  .008  .0004 .011
 (1.20)  -0.32 (1.01)
Age .0003  .00002 .0005
   (2.42)***  (0.75) (1.97)**
Constant .047  0.008 -.041
   (1.40)  (1.29) (0.67)
Observations 467  521 521
R-square 0.14  0.15 0.17
Assets, Age and Branches are entered in logs. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
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